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The state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950, art. 14
The state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place or birth or any of them.
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 art. 15
The above two excerpts from the Indian Constitution of 1950 are clear
indicators that the Indian state is committed, in theory, to building an
egalitarian society. However, critics have alleged that the Indian state,
acting through its legislature and its judiciary, has violated the spirit of the
Indian Constitution, in which the principles of equality and non-
discrimination are enshrined, by establishing one of the most
comprehensive affirmative action programs in the world.' Proponents of
affirmative action have responded by accusing opponents of being
"casteist"; they point to specific constitutional provisions promoting
compensatory discrimination as proof that the Indian state is acting within
constitutional boundaries. Affirmative action in India is referred to as
"compensatory discrimination" by many academicians and is termed
"reservations" or "quotas" in the mainstream Indian media. This Note will
use these terms interchangeably, but will primarily use the term
"compensatory discrimination."
India's compensatory discrimination system is modeled on an
economic theory, pioneered by Glenn Loury, that differentiates between
"human capital" and "social capital. ' 2  "Human capital" refers to an
individual's characteristics that may help him succeed in the material
world.3 "Social capital" refers to the benefits a person gains from being a
member of a community and is characterized by access to networks and
mentors, and by proximity to the power structure.4 The two "capitals" are
related-the more access one has to social capital, the more likely one is to
enjoy greater human capital .
1. ARUN SHOuRIE, FALLING OVER BACKWARDS: AN ESSAY AGAINST RESERVATIONS
AND AGAINST JUDICIAL POPULISM (2006).





COMPENSATORY DISCRIMINATION IN INDIA
In India, the two "capitals" are related and determined by caste-the
lower castes (formally referred to as the Other Backward Classes) and
Dalits (formerly referred to as "untouchables" and formally referred to as
the "Scheduled Castes") have historically enjoyed significantly less social
capital than the upper castes. Thus, Indian lawmakers instituted a
compensatory discrimination system the aim of which was to eliminate the
adverse impact of the historical oppression and segregation of these
communities.6 This compensatory discrimination system has resulted in
preferential treatment for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and "Other
Backward Classes" in the spheres of education and jobs in government-
managed institutions.7
This Note will assess whether the Indian state has been successful in
reducing caste-based inequalities in society or is instead perpetuating the
caste system and the divisions it fosters. Specifically, the Note will focus
on whether the compensatory discrimination system established for the
benefit of the "Other Backward Classes" is reducing caste-based
distinctions in India and leading to a more egalitarian society.
The Note begins by explaining the legal understanding of the term
"caste" and provides an overview of compensatory discrimination in
British-ruled India. Part I briefly examines the judicial and administrative
system that was established in independent India. It then highlights the
relevant constitutional provisions that the Indian Supreme Court (Court) has
interpreted as allowing for compensatory discrimination. Part I analyzes
the landmark cases that the Court has developed in the last sixty years on
the subject of compensatory discrimination. An analysis of these cases will
help the reader understand how the Court's position has evolved from
opposition to compensatory discrimination to that of openness to such
policies. This Part also explains how the term "class" has essentially
become synonymous with "caste." The fourth Part evaluates whether the
compensatory discrimination system is achieving its stated goals of
achieving equality and eradicating caste-based disparities among the Indian
populace or has resulted in perpetuating divisive caste-based identity
politics.
This Note contends that the compensatory discrimination system for
Other Backward Classes (OBCs), which has been designed by the
6. Id.
7. The Scheduled Castes are generally referred to as SCs, Dalits, or Harijans, and
were previously known as the "untouchables." The Scheduled Tribes are referred to as STs
or Adivasis, and the OBCs are normally thought to constitute non-upper caste communities
who do not fall into the SC/ST category.
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legislature and approved by the judiciary, is too politically tarnished to
continue in its present form. The inclusion of politically powerful castes
under the umbrella of "socially and educationally backward classes"
(SEBC) has made a partial mockery of India's compensatory discrimination
program. This abuse of the system is most noticeable at the state level and
now threatens to extend to the central level. The perpetuation of the current
system violates the spirit of the Constitution and furthermore deprives the
most vulnerable sections of society from fully realizing the benefits of
compensatory discrimination. The current system has increased caste-
based distinctions in Indian society and is highly unlikely to lead to the
emergence of a more egalitarian society in the foreseeable future.
L The Meaning of "Caste" and Its Impact on Indian Society
A. What is "Caste"?
The term "caste" has long been identified with Indian society and
culture. According to Laura Jenkins, a professor at the University of
Cincinnati, "caste"
is a rough translation of the indigenous term jati, referring to countless
birth groups that vary depending on context and region, or of another
term, varna, which literally means 'color' and refers to an idealized
hierarchy of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vasihyas, Shudras, and, below all of
these, the avarna, [referred to as "Dalits" in contemporary India].
8
However, A.M. Shah, an Indian academician, states that "although the
ancient four varna scheme is part of the dynamics of the caste system, the
word 'caste' should not be used interchangeably with class," and further
adds that "there is no historical evidence for the popular idea that the
present jatis are a result of the continuous fission of the varnas.
'" 9
Regardless of the debate among sociologists over what constitutes
"caste," Indian law has classified disadvantaged communities who are
entitled to preferential governmental treatment in the sphere of admissions
8. Laura Dudley Jenkins, Contemporary Caste Discrimination and Affirmative
Action, in HINDUISM AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (Timothy Lubin, Jayanth Krishnan, &
Donald R. Davis, Jr. eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2010); see also Frank
de Zwart, The Logic of Affirmative Action: Class, Caste, and Quotas in India, 43 ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA 235, 236-37 (2000) (explaining that the caste system is characterized by
hierarchal, endogamous units whose defining feature is ritual purity).
9. A.M. Shah, The Judicial and Sociological View of Other Backward Classes, in
CASTE: ITS TWENTIETH CENTURY AVATAR 174, 179 (M.N. Srinivas ed., 1997).
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at government-controlled educational institutions and government jobs as
Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), and Other Backward
Classes (OBCs). 10 The term "SC" refers to sub-castes collectively referred
to as the "Dalits" today [previously known as the "untouchables"];" "ST"
refers to tribal communities who live in isolated pockets of India; and
"OBCs" are constituted of those castes identified by government
commissions as "socially and educationally backward classes of citizens"
(SEBC) deserving of preferential treatment.' 2 The identification of those
communities that constitute the SEBC, and the extension of quotas to them,
has been a process that has caused much controversy and violence in
contemporary India. 13 However, there is a strong consensus in the country
that the Dalits have been subject to historical persecution and continue to
remain marginalized in modem-day India.14 Thus, the reservation system
for Dalits and STs has not aroused too much controversy in India.
B. The British and Reservations
When the British arrived in India, they discovered that the caste
system was an integral part of Indian society and that the system, through
sources such as the Vedas and the Manava Dharmasastra, assigned
different rules and regulations to various caste members. 5 Marc Galanter,
a prolific author on the caste system and a law professor at the University of
10. Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Race, Class, Caste... ?
Rethinking Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1296, 1304 (1999).
11. Dalit loosely translates as "oppressed" or "broken."
12. Cunningham & Menon, supra note 10, at 1304.
13. See E.J. Prior, Constitutional Fairness or Fraud on the Constitution?
Compensatory Discrimination in India, 28 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 63, 64-68 (1996)
(describing the violence and chaos that followed the 1990 announcement by the Indian
federal government that the Mandal Commission Report would be implemented); id. (stating
that the Commission, whose findings were concluded in 1980, recommended that 27% of
federal governmental jobs would be set aside for OBCs, in addition to the 22.5% that was
already reserved for SCs (15%) and STs (7.5%) as mandated by the Indian Constitution).
14. See Human Rights Watch, Hidden Apartheid: Caste Discrimination Against
India's "Untouchables" (February 2007) (describing the various atrocities that Dalits are
subject to in modem India); see also Siddharth Vardarajan, Caste Matters in the Indian
Media, THE HINDu, June 3, 2006, available at http://www.thehindu.com2006/06/03/stories/
2006060301841000.htm (explaining how Dalits face discrimination in the Indian media and
in the educational establishment).
15. Jenkins, supra note 8, at 3.
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Wisconsin, has asserted that one of the chief characteristics of ancient
India's legal culture was that of "graded inequality." 16
In the administrative province of Madras Presidency in southern India
[comprising modem day Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and parts of Kerala
and Karnataka], "backward class movements" began protesting against the
dominance of the Brahmins in British-sponsored jobs and educational
institutions as early as 1853. These protests prompted the British to
introduce measures that aimed to limit Brahmin monopoly of influential
positions in the administrative sector.' 7 Efforts to limit Brahmin dominance
of employment and educational opportunities were met with limited
success. During the period 1901-1917, although Brahmins accounted for
only around 3% of the populace in the Madras Presidency, they
nevertheless composed 63% to 66% of the total college graduates.' 8 In
contrast, non-Brahmin Hindus, who constituted 86% of the population in
the Madras Presidency, accounted for only 23% to 24% of the total college
graduates during the same period.' 9
The opposition to Brahminical dominance led to the formation of the
South Indian Liberal Federation [commonly referred to as the Justice Party]
in 1917.20 The Justice Party was not led by Dalits or politicians necessarily
16. Marc Galanter, The Aborted Restoration of "Indigenous" Law in India, 14 COMP.
STuD. IN Soc'Y & HIST. 53, 61 (1972). The term was originally coined by Dr. Ambedkar, a
Dalit and India's first law minister. See Christopher Jaffrelot, DR. AMBEDKAR AND
UNTOUCHABILITY: ANALYZING AND FIGHTING CASTE 35-36 (2005) (attributing the term
"graded inequality" to Dr. Ambedkar as his "main sociological finding" and stating that
graded inequality, distinct from traditional inequality, is a key element of the caste system).
But see Clark D. Cunningham, Why American Lawyers Should Go to India: Retracing
Galanter's Intellectual Odyssey, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 777, 782-83 (1991) (explaining
that the Dharmashastra should be thought as encompassing more than just a legal system).
The word Dharma is understood to mean not just "law", but also "religion" or "duty"-thus,
the Dharmashastras cannot be merely conceived as a legal system, but should rather be
construed as a system that dictated how the Hindu should ideally lead his or her life. Id.
Furthermore, Indian society, although influenced by the above-mentioned religious texts,
was also dynamic-the Vedas and the Dharmashastras did assign rules, but legal practice
was also determined by factors such as custom, geography, and the proximity of a caste
group to the power structure. Id.
17. See P. Radhakrishnan, Backward Class Movements in Tamil Nadu, in CASTE: ITS
TWENTIETH CENTURY AVATAR 110, 112 (M.N. Srinivas ed., 1997) (describing how in 1853,
the Board of Revenue issued an order that mandated that a certain percentage of revenue
officers should be non-Brahmins and furthermore that the chief revenue servants in the
Collector's office must be from different castes).
18. Id. at 112.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 113.
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belonging to the lower castes. 2' Rather, it was a non-Brahmin upper-caste
movement that in 1919 successfully lobbied the British administration to
reserve 28 out of 98 elected seats for non-Brahmin candidates in the Madras
legislature. 22  The non-reserved seats were open to candidates from any
caste. The Justice Party was also responsible for government legislation
that in 1927 reserved 41.7% of jobs for non-Brahmin Hindus, 16% for
Muslims, 16% for Anglo-Indians and Christians, 16% for Brahmins, and
8% for Scheduled Castes.23
At the national level, the Poona Pact of 1932 was the foundation for
reservations for the SCs. 24 The Pact, reached between Hindu caste leaders
and SCs who were organized under the leadership of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
(independent India's first law minister and a principal drafter of the
Constitution), guaranteed that only SC candidates would be able to stand
for election from certain "reserved" constituencies for provincial and
25national elections. The Pact symbolized a national recognition that
reservations would be a "countervailing mechanism against the social
discrimination instinct of Indian society.,
26
The above examples of pre-independence reservations illustrate one
important difference-at the state level, non-SC communities, some of
whom were not necessarily "oppressed," were able to utilize reservations to
counter Brahmin domination of government jobs. However, at the national
level, reservations were extended only to SCs.
21. See id. (explaining that the Justice Party consisted mainly of Vellalas, Reddys,
Kammas, Velamas, and Nairs who belonged to the trading castes; the Party's ideology
propounded that Brahmins were supposedly Aryan invaders who had usurped the glory of
the "Dravidian south"); see also de Zwart, supra note 8, at 243 (highlighting that the Justice
Party was composed mainly of non-Brahmin elites who demanded representation in
government services and claimed "backwardness" on the grounds of under-representation
and not because of their poverty or social backwardness). But see Dr. Subramanium
Swamy, Redefining Secularism, THE HINDU, Mar. 18, 2004, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2004/03/18/stories/2004031801941000.htm (explaining how the
Aryan invasion theory, which is the basis of the supposed difference between the "Dravidian
south" and the "Aryan north," is the propaganda of prominent Marxist scholars). Swamy
also explains that Hindu society has offered an avenue for upward caste mobility through a
process known as Sanskritization. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 114.
24. Anand Teltumbde, Reverting to the Original Vision of Reservations, ECON. &
POL.WKLY, June 23, 2007, at 2383-84.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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II. Independent India and Its Choices
India gained her independence from Great Britain in 1947. The new
Indian state was modeled essentially on British lines-a parliamentary
democracy was established with the President as the titular head of state,
while the legal system was constituted according to common-law traditions.
There are a few key reasons why Indian leaders chose to establish a legal
system based on the British model. First, the existing system was well-
entrenched and supported by a powerful class of lawyers who genuinely
believed in its merits and did not consider a revival of the traditional Hindu
sastric system to be beneficial either to them or to the country as a whole. 7
27. See Clark D. Cunningham, Why American Lawyers Should Go to India: Retracing
Galanter's Intellectual Odyssey, 16 A.B.A.J. 777, 784 (1991) (reviewing MARC GALANTER,
LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN INDIA (1989), explaining that the British first exercised
power in parts of India through the East India Company from the 17th century until 1858).
During this time period, the British allowed the satsras and the sharia to remain the source of
authority for Hindus and Muslims respectively in legal matters related to the civil arena (as
opposed to criminal law topics). Id. However, even during this period, profound changes
were introduced in the legal sector. Id. For instance, the British authorized translations of
the Dharmashastras (sacred Hindu texts) into English legal terminology-in this process,
many concepts were distorted. Id. Second, the British added "clarifications" to these
translated doctrines, thereby further distorting the original meaning of the translated texts.
Id. Third, Cunningham highlights that "the very elevation of the sastric text over unwritten
custom was a fundamental shift from the sastric tradition." Id. Finally, the British, in their
efforts to accord due importance to the "force of custom," misunderstood how to apply this
concept to legal matters in a spirit consistent with sastric methodology. Id.
On a procedural level, British practices further eroded the traditional Hindu structure.
Litigation of a certain case was conceived as an isolated incident between two concerned
parties without taking into account other existing disputes between them. Id. at 785.
Furthermore, Cunningham notes that "the status and ties of the parties were ignored." Id.
Moreover, the British system promoted binding, "winner-take-all" resolutions to conflicts,
whereas the panchayat system focused on solutions that promoted consensus and
compromise among the parties involved. Id. Finally, the British system enforced rulings
through the police powers of the state, but the sastric system enforced its rulings generally
through more localized and unofficial avenues such as community pressures, the honor
system of the "caste," and ex-communication. Id. The above lines indicate that the sastric
method of legal dispute resolution, while having some positive features, also took into
account less egalitarian principles such as the caste of the parties at dispute which
perpetuated the existing status quo system of "graded inequality." Id.
In 1858, the British Crown took over the administration of India from the East India
Company-the Anglicization of the Indian legal system proceeded at a rapid pace from this
point onwards. Id. The judicial and administrative systems were subject to massive
reforms, the British stopped relying on pandits (Brahmin scholars) for advice on how to
interpret the sastras, and commercial, criminal, and procedural laws were codified by 1882.
Id. Although Hindus continued to rely on the sastras for personal law matters related to
topics such as marriage and inheritance, British courts, and not pandits, were the sole
interpreters and arbiters on outstanding disputes. Id. Cunningham highlights that sastric
490
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Second, the proponents of a sastric system were not well organized and
were unable to articulate a clear vision.28 Furthermore, Jawaharlal Nehru,
India's first Prime Minister, and B.R. Ambedkar, the architect of India's
Constitution, were both common-law trained attorneys. Although M.K.
Gandhi's followers and the "traditionalists" wanted to adopt some version
of the panchayat-sastric system, the Nehru-Ambedkar vision triumphed.29
Nehru and Ambedkar were both committed to the idea of an
egalitarian India. These men were cognizant that a Dharmasastra-based
system would be contrary to egalitarian principles and would evoke
discontent among the lower castes. 30 In 1946, a Constituent Assembly was
established under Ambedkar's leadership.3' In a clear sign that independent
India would be committed to an egalitarian society, the Constitution drew
its inspiration from the United States Bill of Rights, the Declaration of the
Rights of Man from France, the Irish Constitution of 1935, and the
Universal Human Rights Charter. 32 It declared the Republic of India to be
committed to the ideals of securing justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity
for all its citizens.33
The key Articles of the Constitution that would aid India in its
objectives included Article 14 of the Constitution, which guaranteed equal
protection of the law for all of India's citizens; Article 15, which prohibited
discrimination on numerous grounds including caste; Article 16, which
promoted equality in public employment; and Article 17, which abolished
the practice of untouchability. 34 The Constitution also specifically set aside
seats in state legislatures and the Parliament for SC/ST individuals.35
tradition was thus replaced "with a body of British judicial precedent misleadingly called
'Hindu law."' Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 788.
30. Id.
31. See Prior, supra note 13, at 75 (discussing the historical background of the
Constituent Assembly).
32. Id. at 786.
33. Id. at 787.
34. Id. at 74-80; see INDIA CONST. art. 14 ("The state shall not deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India").
The Constitution further states:
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them; (2) No citizen shall, on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be
subject to disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to-(a) access
to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) the
use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained
15 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2009)
India's Constitution, described as the world's "most complex, 36
consists of more than 370 articles and over ninety amendments.37 India is a
union of twenty-eight states with a strong federal (central) government; it is
a bicameral parliamentary democracy; and the unitary three-tiered judicial
system is composed of lower trial courts, a high court for every state, and a
Supreme Court.38 In India, "fundamental rights" include equality, speech
and assembly, personal liberty, and religious freedom. 39 The Court has an
obligation to enforce these rights.4n  The Constitution also contains
"Directive Principles" which although non-justiciable, nevertheless declare
economic justice and social equality as aspirational goals.
4 1
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public;
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special
provision for women or children.
Id. at art. 15. Article 16 states:
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the State; (2) No citizen shall,
on ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or
any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any
employment or office under the State. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent
Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of
employment or appointment to an office [under the Government of, or any local
or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to
residence within that State or Union territory] prior to such employment or
appointment; (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward
class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented
in the services under the State.
Id. at art. 16;
Id. at art. 17 'Untouchability' is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The
enforcement of any disability arising out of 'Untouchability' shall be an offence punishable
in accordance with the law.
35. See generally.
36. Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India. 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 476, 476 (2003).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 479.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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III. Legal Challenges to Compensatory Discrimination
and the Judiciary's Response
A. From Procedural Equality to Substantive Equality
The judiciary's position on compensatory discrimination in India today
differs from that in 1950. In 1951, an upper-caste Hindu based in the
region then called the State of Madras challenged a state medical college's
reservation system. 42 The college based its admissions policy for different
castes and religious groups on the demographic composition of these
communities in the state.4 3 The plaintiff in State of Madras v. Champakam
Dorairajan asserted that the government's reservation policies violated
Article 14 and Article 15(1) of the Indian Constitution.44 The plaintiff
argued that a state could not reserve seats in educational institutions on
caste-based criteria because the Constitution declared all men equal before
the law regardless of caste.45
State of Madras v. Dorairajan was the first major test of the Indian
judiciary on the issue of compensatory discrimination. The Supreme Court
of India adopted a narrow and literalist reading of the Constitution by ruling
that compensatory discrimination policies violated the named Articles of
the Constitution. 46 However, the central government, led by Prime Minister
Nehru, which enjoyed a comfortable majority in the Parliament, amended
Article 15 of the Constitution to authorize affirmative action in favor of
untouchables and "backward classes., 47 Specifically, the amendment reads:
"Nothing in this article or in clause (2) shall prevent the State from making
any special provision for the advancement of socially and educationally
backward classes or citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes. ,
48
Prime Minister Nehru is generally given credit for bravely advocating
progressive policies by pushing forth the amendment. 49 However, some
42. State of Madras v. Dorairajan, 1951 A.I.R. 38 (S.C.) 226.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 227.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 228.
47. See Neuborne, supra note 36, at 488 (describing how the government amended
Article 15 after State of Madras v. Dorairajan was decided).
48. INDIA CONST. art 15, § 4. For the full text of article 15, see supra note 34.
49. Marc Galanter, Symbolic Activism: A Judicial Encounter with the Contours of
India's Compensatory Discrimination Policy, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF JUSTICE V.R. KRISHNA IYER 229, 231 (R. Dhavan et al. eds., 1985).
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critics questioned whether India's new leaders had committed a grave error
by including the phrase "socially and educationally backward classes" in
the Constitutional amendment. They criticized the lack of consensus as to
what criteria should be used to determine which groups constituted these
"backward classes." 50  B.R. Ambedkar, India's first law minister and a
principle drafter of the Constitution, stated that "backward classes
are... nothing else but a collection of certain castes." 5' However,
academicians, such as Frank de Zwart, have posited that neither the
Constituent Assembly nor post-independence parliaments intended for
reservations to be tailored on the basis of caste.
52
In 1953, the first Backward Classes Commission was established
under Article 340 of the Indian Constitution53 to identify communities that
would qualify for compensatory discrimination. 4 The Commission used
four criteria to determine social and educational "backwardness": low
status in the traditional caste system, poor educational achievement, under-
representation in public-sector employment, and under-representation in the
trade and business sector. The Commission identified 2,399 castes as
"backward"; this computation did not include the SC/ST population of
50. See de Zwart, supra note 8, at 239 ("[W]hen Nehru spoke on behalf of the Socially
and Educationally Backward Classes, nobody knew who these classes were."); K.D.
Saksena, Policy Changes Needed on Reservations, ECON. & POL. WEEKLY, June 30, 2007, at
2494 ("There has been no census of backward classes in the absence of any systematic
attempt to conceptualize and scientifically define these categories of citizens.").
51. De Zwart, supra note 8, at 239.
52. See id. at 240 (highlighting that the Constituent Assembly and successive
Parliaments after independence never intended for caste-based reservations and further
noting that a Central Minister of Home Affairs in the early 1960s recommended state
governments to use economic indicators, rather than caste status, to identify candidates for
reservations).
53. INDIA CONST. art. 340(1). The article states:
The president may by order appoint a commission, consisting of such persons as
he thinks, fit to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally
backward classes within the territory of India and the difficulties under which
they labor and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by
the union or any state to remove such difficulties and as to improve 'their
condition and as to the grants that should be made, and the order appointing
such commission shall define the procedure to be followed by the commission.
Id.
54. Saksena, supra note 50, at 2494.
55. Id.
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India.56 The Commission also recommended that women be treated as a
"backward class."
57
However, the Commission's findings were never implemented. 8
Even Kaka Kalelkar, Chairman of the Backward Classes Commission,
expressed grave misgivings about the report.5 9 Kalelkar requested that the
Indian President reject the Commission's findings because quotas on the
basis of caste would have an adverse effect on society. Specifically, he
observed that indigent Muslims and Christians, many of whom may have
been former Hindu SC's, might not qualify for quotas because their faiths
did not officially recognize a caste system.6° Furthermore, Kalekar noted
that "[i]f we eschew the principle of caste, it would be possible to help the
extremely poor and deserving from all communities.",6 1  Yet, he also
observed that "care [should be] taken to give preference to those who come
from the traditionally neglected social classes., 62 Thus, Kalekar was not
against the concept of reservations per se; rather, he was only expressing
skepticism over the methodology by which disadvantaged sections had
been identified by his own Commission.
The Commission's recommendations lay dormant and ignored by the
central government for many years. State governments freely tailored
reservation policies for disadvantaged sections of their populations on the
basis of caste, although the federal Ministry of Home Affairs declared in
the early 1960s that it would be preferable to apply economic tests rather
than caste criteria.63 This advice has essentially been ignored by state
governments and by successive post-1990 federal governments. In
hindsight, Kalelkar's fears were well founded. Today, Hindu castes battle
56. Id.
57. A. Ramaiah, Identifying Other Backward Classes, ECON. AND POL. WKLY., June 6,
1992, at 1203.
58. Id.
59. See id. (stating that the government did not implement the report because it feared
that backward communities who were not identified by the Commission would be isolated
and that the genuinely disadvantaged in the communities identified would not be able to
obtain benefits since too many communities were identified); de Zwart, supra note 8, at 241
(explaining that Kalelkar foresaw that certain castes would comer all the benefits).
60. Balaji v. State of Mysore, 1963 A.I.R. 50 S.C. 649, 656.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Saksena, supra note 50, at 2494 ("The ministry of home affairs addressed all
the state governments stating that while they 'have the discretion to choose their own
criteria, in view of the government of India it would be better to apply economic tests than to
go by caste."').
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for inclusion in the list of OBCs, while Dalit Christians and Dalit Muslims
demand inclusion in the list of SCs.
Even though the Kalelkar report was never implemented, the Indian
Supreme Court granted certiorari to cases emanating from state courts
dealing with compensatory discrimination. Many of these cases involved
compensatory discrimination for OBCs at the state level. In Balaji v. State
of Mysore (1963), the Supreme Court held that caste could not be used as
the only criterion for backwardness when responding to a petition
challenging Mysore's policy of reserving 68% of the seats in engineering
and medical colleges for those communities categorized as SC, ST, or
OBC.64 The Court highlighted its view that while caste could be a relevant
factor in determining backwardness, poverty also played a significant role
in determining social backwardness. It stated, "classes of citizens who are
deplorably poor automatically become socially backward., 65 The Court
also held that reservations should not exceed 50% of available seats.
66
In Balaji, the Court attempted to strike a balance between the need to
help the non-SC/ST backward classes, while also ensuring that well-
qualified upper caste candidates were not denied admission due to their
caste. Furthermore, the Court conceded that the quality of graduates from
these professional colleges would diminish if admissions policies were
"unduly liberalized., 67  In Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its holding in Balaji and firmly reiterated "that under no
circumstance [can] a 'class' be equated to a 'caste.'" 68 However, the Court
sent out a confusing message in A. Periakaruppan v. State of T.N. when it
confirmed its holdings in the prior cases while also noting that "a caste has
always been recognized as a class."69 The Court articulated its rationale for
upholding compensatory discrimination policies by stating:
64. See Balaji, 1963 A.I.R. 50 S.C. at 654-55 (describing in detail the effect of the
impugned order passed on July 31, 1962).
65. Id. at 659 (recounting the links between poverty and social backwardness); see
also Prior, supra note 13, at 87 ("Essentially, Balaji allows caste to be considered, but does
not allow it to be the sole criterion of backwardness.").
66. Id. at 663 ("[S]peaking generally and in a broad way, a special provision should be
less than 50 per cent; how much less than 50 per cent would depend on the relevant
prevailing circumstances in each case."); see also Prior, supra note 13, at 87 (recounting the
Court's analysis leading to the 50% limitation).
67. Id. at 662 (refusing to deny the fact that "it would be against the national interest to
exclude from the portals of our Universities qualified and competent students on the ground
that all the seats in the University are reserved for weaker elements in society").
68. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, 1964 A.I.R. 51 S.C. 1825, 1834 (emphasizing the
Court's separation of the two constructs and its reasoning for erecting this barrier).
69. A. Periakaruppan v. State of T.N., 1971 A.I.R. 58 S.C. 2303, 2309-10 (citing to
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[W]e should not forget that it is against the immediate interest of the
Nation to exclude from... our medical colleges qualified and
competent students but then the immediate advantages of the Nation
have to be harmonised with its long range interests. It cannot be denied
that unaided many sections of the people... cannot compete with the
advanced sections .... Advantages secured due to historical reasons
should not be considered as fundamental rights. [The] Nation's interest
will be best served-taking a long range view-if the backward classes
are helped to march forward and take their place in line with the
advanced sections of the people
70
Even though the primary focus of this Note is on analyzing the
reservation policies for OBCs, the Court's holding in State of Kerala v.
Thomas (1976) that the government could justify exempting SC/ST
employees from mandatory tests for job promotions under the aegis of
Article 16(1) indicates how broadly the Court moved toward endorsing
substantive equality.7 1 In Thomas, the Justices upheld a Kerala government
order exempting SC/ST government clerks from passing compulsory tests
required for job promotions for a period of two years and further gave the
clerks two more opportunities to pass the examination.72 Article 16(1)
guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.73
Article 16(4) states, "Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
making any provision for the reservation of appointment or posts in favor of
any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not
adequately represented in the services under the State."
Although the Court could have construed this exemption for SC/ST
candidates under the aegis of Article 16(4), it instead relied on Article
16(1). The Court highlighted the fact that Article 46, which is a Directive
Principle [i.e. a non-justiciable principle], urges the Indian State to
"promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the
weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and
all forms of exploitation. "04  Furthermore, the Court added that Article
Chitralekha to assert that "caste is not a relevant circumstance in ascertaining the
backwardness of a class" and downplaying the strict parameters of "that earlier case").
70. Id. at 2309 (describing a reasoning opposite to that taken in the Balaji case).
71. See Galanter, supra note 49, at 234 (describing the system by which SC/ST
employees were exempted from passing certain tests).
72. Id. at 235 (illustrating the Court's reasoning in upholding the government order).
73. INDIA CONST. art. 16(1).
74. INDIA CONST. art. 46.
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335," which directs the state to give special consideration to the claims of
SC/ST communities in matters of public employment, bolstered the
government's position.76 Thus, the Court found that the government's
policy of categorizing SC/ST employees as deserving of special treatment is
"a just and reasonable classification [that has] rational nexus to the object of
equal opportunity ... relating to [public] employment. '7 7 Supreme Court
Justice K.K. Mathew declared that the Constitution guaranteed not just
"equality of opportunity," but also "equality of result."7 8
The Court's holding in Thomas is relevant to the subject of this Note
in two ways. First, it allowed the government greater freedom to design
and implement affirmative action programs. 79  Second, the "efficiency"
aspect of Article 335, which instructed the government to consider the
competent functioning of the administration when designing affirmative
action programs, took a backseat to the goal of uplifting the SC/ST
communities.8 ° While the goal of uplifting SC/ST communities is
admirable, the Court's approach in Thomas sets a poor precedent. It allows
the government to relax standards for promotion in jobs and stretched the
interpretation of Article 16(1) to include compensatory discrimination not
just for entry into government service but also for promotions.
81
75. Art. 335 states: "The Claims of the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes shall be taken into consideration, constantly with the maintenance of the efficiency of
administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union of a State." Id.
76. Galanter, supra note 49, at 235 (treating Article 335 as an essential link in the
Chief Justice's chain of reasoning, and stating that it "directs the state to take into their
consideration their claims regarding service under the state").
77. Id.
78. Id. at 236 (articulating Justice Mathew's view of what equality requires).
79. Id. at 240 (describing the relative freedom the government enjoys in implementing
such programs); see also Prior, supra note 13, at 90 (describing the "new thinking" that took
place after Thomas).
80. See SHOURIE, supra note 1, at 192 (describing as a "chant" progressive Justice
Krishna Iyer's commentary on Article 355, which the author states "cannot but imperil
administrative efficiency"). Shourie goes on to quote the Justice's assertion that "social
stratification, the bane of the caste system, could be undone and vertical mobility won not by
hortative exercises but by experience of shared power." Id.
81. In Indra Sawheny v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447, the Court later ruled
that compensatory discrimination should not be extended to promotions. However, a
Constitutional amendment in 1995 granted this special treatment to SC/ST communities.
See SHOURIE, supra note 1, at 12 (describing how a new clause, 4(A), was added to Article
16 and contained language that would allow for such treatment). Specifically, 4(A)
provides: "[niothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for
reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services under the
State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the
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B. The Mandal Commission and the Sawhney Judgment.
In 1978, two years after Thomas, the government established a new
Backward Classes Commission, known as the Mandal Commission, to
identify communities that were "socially and educationally backward.
',82
The Commission ignored prior Supreme Court holdings and used the term
"caste" synonymously with "class"; it also utilized eleven criteria for
determining social and economic backwardness. 83  While the Kalelkar
Commission had identified 2,399 castes as "socially and educationally
backward," (SEBC) the Mandal Commission identified 3,743 castes as
fitting that category. 84
The methodology used by the Commission was fraught with errors.
85
First, the Commission claimed that 52% of India's population was
State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State."
82. Saksena, supra note 50, at 2494 (describing the formation and membership of the
second commission).
83. Id.; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447, 510-11 (describing
the eleven criteria the court determined to be significant). Specifically, the Court laid forth
the following categorization:
(A) Social: (i) Castes/Classes considered as socially backward by others;
(ii) Castes/Classes which mainly depend on manual labor for their livelihood;
(iii) Castes/Classes where at least 25% females and 10% males above the State
average get married at an age below 17 years in rural areas and at least 10%
females and 5% males do so in urban areas; (iv) Caste/Classes where
participation of females in work is at least 25% above the State average
(B) Educational: (v) Castes/Classes where the number of children in the age
group of 5-15 years who never attended school is at least 25% above the State
average; (vi) Castes/Classes where the rate of student drop-out in the age group
of 5-15 years is at least 25% above the State average; (vii) Castes/Classes
amongst whom the proportion of matriculates is at least 25% below the State
average;
(C) Economic: (viii) Caste/Classes where the average value of family assets is
at least 25% below the State average; (ix) Caste/Classes where the number of
families living in kucha (mud) houses is at least 25% above the State average;
(x) Caste/Classes where the source of drinking water is beyond half a kilometer
for more than 50% of the households; (xi) Caste/Classes where the number of
households having taken consumption loan is at least 25% above the State
average. A weightage of 3 points each was assigned to social indicators, 2
points each to the educational indicators, and 1 point each to the economic
indicator.
84. Id. at 593-94 (describing the findings of both commissions).
85. But see V. Venkatesan's interview with P.S. Krishnan, former Secretary, Minister
of Welfare, Petitioners Were Wrong in History, FRONTLINE, Apr. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/fline/fl2407/stories/20070420003901900.htm
(defending the Mandal Commission's methodology of measuring the backward classes).
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comprised of castes belonging to the OBC category, based on a census
taken by the British in India in 193 1.86 This percentage is inconsistent with
the findings of the National Sample Survey's 1999-2000 findings that only
36% of the nation's population comprises OBC communities.87
Arun Shourie, a noted journalist and a former Indian federal minister,
has exposed the numerous flaws in the Mandal Commission's
methodology.88 Some of his main criticisms include that experts suggested
that type of employment, or at a minimum a combination of caste and
employment, was a better determinant of backwardness than just caste, but
the Commission chose caste alone;89 that the Commission, although deeply
skeptical of the accuracy of the information provided by states about which
castes constituted the backward classes, nevertheless eventually accepted
the information; 90 and that the Commission itself conceded that its final list
was not the product of rigorous "academic research," but rather the result of
a survey that was a "rough and ready tool for evolving a set of simple
criteria for identifying social and educational backwardness.
'" 91
The most scathing criticism leveled at the Commission came from one
of its own members. L.R. Naik, the sole SC member of the Commission,
which was otherwise comprised of members who belonged to communities
labeled as OBCs, noted:
I hold very sincerely that castes/classes mentioned in the common
list.., are not at the same degree or level of social and educational
backwardness and I fear that the safeguards recommended for their
advancement will not percolate to less unfortunate sections among them
and that the Constitutional objectives proclaiming an establishment of
an egalitarian society will remain a myth .... [D]uring the course of
my extensive tours [through India], I observed that a tendency is fast
developing among "Intermediate Backward Classes" to repeat the
treatments or rather ill-treatments, they themselves have received from
times immemorial at the hands of the upper castes, against... the
86. Suijit Bhalla & Sunil Jain, Quota: Just How Many OBCs Are There?, REDIFF
NEWS, May 8, 2006, available at http://in.rediff.com/money/2006/may/08quota.htm.
87. Id.
88. See generally SHOURIE, supra note 1 (critiquing what Mr. Shourie believes is a
twisting of the Indian Constitution to allow for the furtherance of the caste system, via a
refiguring of castes to enable them to receive certain benefits).
89. See id. at 91 (discussing the experts suggesting that occupation was a better
indicator of backwardness, thus occupations, or at least occupation and caste should be used
as criterions for backwardness).
90. See id. at 86-88 (describing the Commissions reaction to the information provided
by the States).
91. Id. at 88.
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"Depressed Backward Classes".... Several observers feel that the
logic of democratic politics and mass mobilization has brought casteism
to the center of the stage. It is with regret, I affirm that [OBC] political
leaders... are not immune from such aberration.. . all they seem to be
doing is to emulate some disgruntled upper castes in usurping economic
and political power in the name of backward classes.
92
The above lines clearly indicate that Naik was deeply concerned that
upper caste prejudice against the lower castes and Dalits was now being
replicated by certain sections of the OBC community itself. His reference
to "Intermediate Backward Classes" and "Depressed Backward Classes" is
crucial-the former category referred to the privileged among the OBCs,
many of whom owned large tracts of agricultural land.9 3 The latter term
referred to the genuinely disadvantaged among the OBCs who traditionally
were employed as blacksmiths, fishermen, or barbers, for example.94
Furthermore, Naik was also concerned that the implementation of the
Mandal Commission would perpetuate the caste system and would serve as
a tool by which casteism would remain as a social evil in Indian society.
95
Like the Kaka Kalelkar Report, the Mandal Report lay dormant for ten
years. However, in August 1990, the federal government decided to
implement one part of the Mandal Commission report-the
recommendation that 27% of vacancies in government employment be
reserved for those communities labeled as OBCs.96 Violent protests
followed.97 In August 1992 the Supreme Court passed judgment in what is
popularly referred to as the "Mandal" case.98 In Indra Sawhney v. Union of
92. Id. at 102-03.
93. Chandrabhan Prasad, Mandal's True Inheritors, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Apr. 12,
2006, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1486250.cms (looking
back at Naik's earlier failure to sign the Mandal recommendations and his hypothesis that
OBCs are now split into two groups, the "Intermediate Backward Class," consisting of
relatively powerful landowners and "Depressed Backward Classes" or "Most Backward
Classes" that are economically marginalized).
94. Id.
95. See SHOURIF, supra note 1, at 102-03 (outlining the potential for continuation of
the caste system under the Mandal Commission's framework).
96. See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447, 592 (upholding
the Constitutionality of implementing the recommendations of the Mandal Commission
regarding OBCs, although it also held that the "creamy layer" of the backward classes must
be excluded from benefits).
97. See V.P. Singh to be Cremated at Sangam Today, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Nov. 29,
2008, available at http://www.htmedia.in/Section.aspx?Page=Page-HTMedia-AboutUs
(describing the violent protests that followed the implementation of the Mandal
recommendations).
98. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447.
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India, the Supreme Court of India upheld the government's decision to
implement the Mandal Commission recommendation regarding quotas for
OBCs in government jobs.99 The Court highlighted the fact that a state has
broad powers to determine whether a given class of citizens comprise a
backward class or not, although ultimately such a determination was subject
to judicial review.l °° The Court tackled the issue of the meaning of the
term "Backward Classes." It first noted that Article 16(4), which allowed
the government to make special provisions for "Backward Classes" in
matters of public employment, did not define the term. l0' The Court then
pointed out that the term "Backward" in Article 15(4) of the Constitution,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of caste, was qualified by the
phrase "socially and educationally."
' 10 2
In a departure from its position in Balaji, where the Court had
unequivocally refused to equate caste and class, the Court now posited that
backward class under Article 16(4) did not imply "socially and
educationally backward" classes of citizens. 10 3 It acknowledged that since
Balaji, "it has been assumed that the backward class of citizens
contemplated by Article 16(4) is the same as socially and educationally
backward classes.., mentioned in Article 15(4)." 104
It then rejected such an understanding and stated that "it would... be
not correct to say that 'backward class of citizens' in Art. 16(4) are the
same as the socially and educationally backward classes in Art. 15(4)." 105
99. See generally id. (weighing, within acceptable Constitutional parameters, the
social and economic realities of castes against the Government action in instituting the
Mandal Commission recommendations).
100. Id. at 555-59 (describing how "backward" will vary from state to state but
adopting certain limits-i.e. the "creamy layer" of the backward classes must be removed
from the equation).
101. Id. at 598 (noting that while Article 16, § 4 of the Indian Constitution, which deals
with Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment, states: "[N]othing in this article shall
prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in
favor of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately
represented in the services under the State ... " it did not itself define "backward class").
102. Id. at 598 (pointing to Article 15, § 4 of the Indian Constitution art 15, which
states, "[N]othing in this article or in clause (2) or article 29 shall prevent the State from
making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.").
103. Id. at 557; Balaji v. State of Mysore, (1963) 50 S.C.R. 649, 656.
104. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447, 556.
105. Id.
502
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Rather, the Court said that Article 16(4) was designed specifically to
promote the interests of socially backward classes. 10 6 It noted:
Social backwardness leads to educational backwardness and both of
them together lead to poverty-which in turn perpetuates the social and
educational backwardness .... We are, accordingly, of the opinion that
the backwardness contemplated by Article 16(4) is mainly social
backwardness. They feed upon each other constituting a vicious
circle."°7
The Court asserted that in a diverse nation such as India, a variety of
methods were permissible to determine which groups of people constituted
backward classes. 08 The Court said that although caste alone may not
always be the determinant of backwardness, 09 it also noted however that
caste was the equivalent of a "social class." 110 Members of a caste were
part of a "socially homogenous class," and membership in this group was
involuntary and hereditary."' The Court also pointed out that the Mandal
Commission gave more priority to indicators of social backwardness than
educational backwardness in its determination of which groups constituted
OBCs. 112  It then rejected the proposition that Article 16(2), which
prohibited the government from discriminating in matters of public
employment on the basis of caste, explicitly prevented the consideration of
caste in determining backwardness. 1
3
The Court explained that reservations were being instituted for
"backward classes," and not backward castes. 114 However, it then stated
that a caste would be considered a "backward class" if: (i) it met the criteria
used to measure backwardness and, (ii) the caste "was not adequately
106. Id. at 557 ("[Flurther, if one keeps in mind the context in which Art. 16(4) was
enacted it would be clear that the accent was upon social backwardness.").
107. Id.
108. Id. at 555.
109. Id. (pointing to the classification of Muslims and certain Christian denominations
in Kerala as backward).
110. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447,553.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 557.
113. See INDIA CONST. art 16, § 2 (stating that, "no citizen shall, on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for,
or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State"); Indra
Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447, 555 (rejecting the proposition that once
it is found that a backward class is not adequately represented in the Services of a State, the
bar of Article 16, § 2 of the Indian Constitution is not a limitation).
114. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447, 555.
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represented in the services under the State," as mentioned in Article
16(4).' The Court asserted that socially backward classes [such as the
OBCs identified by the Mandal Commission] were under-represented in
public employment and this was the "lingering effect" of past
discrimination-thus, quotas were necessary to remedy this
discrimination. 1 6 However, in future scenarios, communities other than
those characterized by caste could be considered as "backward classes" and
thus qualify for reservations.
1 17
The Court directed the government to ensure that the "creamy
layers"-i.e. privileged-sections of OBCs be excluded from the benefit of
reservations.1 18 The Court left the factors that would be used for the
identification of this "creamy layer" in the hands of the government.' 19
The Court added that individuals comprising this "creamy layer" were not
necessarily required to be identified on the basis of income. 20 It explained
that an OBC individual who earned a substantial sum of money in a rural
area could still be considered poor in an urban setting and thus, may not be
a part of the "creamy layer.' 21 Furthermore, the Court added that the OBC
family of an individual who earned a significant salary in a foreign nation
as a laborer could still be "socially backward" in their home setting.
122
Thus, the Court possibly permitted even affluent individuals belonging to
OBC communities to qualify for reservations if the government chooses not
115. Id.
116. Id. at 556.
117. See Sawhney, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. at 560. (providing that "backward classes"
includes socially and educationally backward classes).
118. See id. at 560 (recommending that the government of India specify the basis of
exclusion from the reservations, whether it be on the basis of income, the extent of holding,
or of "creamy layer").
119. See id. (recommending that the government specify the basis, but not requiring
particular factors).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 559 (stating that a particular income made in Bombay, Delhi, or Calcutta
may not be extraordinary, whereas in rural India, such income would be a "handsome
income").
122. See id. (providing that a member of the carpenter caste who goes to the Middle
East to work may receive income that is high by Indian standards, but not necessarily in the
particular country where it was made); see also NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR BACKWARD
CLASSES, PERSONS EXCLUDED FROM RESERVATION WHICH CONSTITUTE CREAMY LAYER,
http://ncbc.nic.in/html/creamylayer.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2009) (providing that the
Government eventually mandated that the off-spring of those OBC members who earned
more than Rs 100,000 per anum ($2500 U.S.D.) would be classified as belonging to the
"creamy layer") (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
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to identify the "creamy layer" based on economic criteria. The Court also
rejected a 10% quota for the poor among the upper castes.' 23
C. The Mandal II Judgment: Perpetuating Caste-Based Reservations
The issue of compensatory discrimination has refused to fade away
from public controversy and litigation. In May 2006, upper-caste students
and professionals protested vehemently against the central government's
decision to implement another part of the Mandal Commission's Report
recommending a 27% reservation for OBCs in government-managed
educational institutes. 2 4  The government implemented this part of the
Mandal Report by passing the Central Educational Institutions Act of
2006125 after parliament approved the Ninety-Third Amendment to the
Constitution. 126  This Amendment was applied to Article 15 of the
Constitution and stated that:
Nothing in this article... shall prevent the State from making any
special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens.., in so far as such special
provisions relate to their admission to the educational institutions
including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by
the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in
clause (1) of Article 30.127
123. See id. at 578 (stating that the 10% quota is constitutionally impermissible).
124. See Arun Ram, Protests Erupt in Chennai's Streets, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS,
May 25, 2006, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1031349&CatID=2 (last
visited Feb. 28, 2009) (describing the protests of students in response to the government's
support of the proposed 27 percent reservation) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also Doctors End Strikes Not Protests,
ExPRESSINDIA.COM, May 31, 2006, http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid
=68532 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (stating that though resident doctors at the five premier
medical colleges ended their strikes, they would continue to protest) (on file with
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
125. See Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, No. 5 of
2007; INDIA CONST. art. 15: amended by the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act,
2005 (providing for the reservation in admission of students belonging to Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, and the Other Backward Classes of citizens to certain educational
institutions maintained by the central government).
126. See INDIA CONST. art. 15: amended by the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment)
Act, 2005 (providing that the government of India may create law to advance socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens).
127. Id.
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The Supreme Court, in its April 2008 judgment, re-affirmed the
legality of India's reservations system and its expansion to educational
institutions managed by the central government. 128 Specifically, in Ashoka
Kumar Thakur v. Union of India,129 the Court held that:
(i) The Ninety-Third Amendment did not "violate
the 'basic structure' of the Constitution" and
was thereby constitutional;1
30
(ii) That Articles 15(4) and 15(5) of the
Constitution were not mutually contradictory
and thus Article 15(5) was not ultra vires; 
3 1
(iii) That the exclusion of minority educational
institutions from Article 15(5) was not
violative of Article 14;132
128. See Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 S.C.C. 1, 3 (upholding the
reservations system).
129. Id. (holding the reservation and its application to government-managed
educational institutions constitutional). In Thakur, the Supreme Court of India considered
the validity of India's reservation system and its expansion to educational institutions
managed by the government. Id. at 1, 27-28. The Court stated that it was conscious of the
fact that reservation should not result in reverse discrimination. Id. at 3. The reservation
system was challenged on the basis of various technical constitutional grounds, including
grounds that the Ninety-Third Amendment to the Constitution, which permitted the
reservation, violated the basic structure of the Constitution; that Article 15(5) of the
Constitution was ultra vires; that the exclusion of minority educational institutions from
Article 15(5) violated Article 14 of the Constitution; that the manner in which SEBCs were
identified violated Article 15(1) of the Constitution; and that the "creamy layer" should not
be excluded from SEBCs. Id. at 28, 34, 36, 47. The Court found that the Ninety-Third
Amendment did not violate the basic structure of the Constitution because past judges
concluded that the power of amendment could be used, and was used widely, even for
fundamental rights. Id. at 32. The Court also found that Articles 15(4) and 15(5) were
enabling provisions, that operate in their own field, and thus were not contradictory. Id. at
35. Thus, Article 15(5) was not ultra vires. Id. at 35. As to the contention that Article 15(5)
provided for the exclusion of minority educational institutions, the Court upheld this because
these institutions constituted a separate class and were protected by separate constitutional
provisions. Id. at 36. In addition, the Court found that the determination of SEBCs did not
violate Article 15(1) of the Constitution because lists of SEBCs were not based solely on
caste, and that other considerations were taken into account. Id. at 47. Finally, the Court
found that the "creamy layer" must be excluded from SEBCs because not to exclude them
would impair proper identification of the backward class and that one of the main criteria for
identifying SEBCs is poverty, to which the exclusion of the "creamy layer" is necessary. Id.
at 49.
130. Thakur, (2008) 6 S.C.C. at 34.
131. See id. at 36 (stating that Article 15(5) is "constitutionally valid").
132. See id. (stating that Article 15(5) is not violative of Article 14 because the
"minority educational institutions, by themselves, are a separate class and their rights are
protected by other constitutional provisions").
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(iv) That the manner in which "socially and
educationally backward classes" were
identified was not violative of Article 15(1) of
the Constitution and;'
33
(v) That the "creamy layer" of those belonging to
these socially and educationally backward
classes must be excluded from the benefits of
quotas. 134
Specifically, with regard to the fourth holding, the Court highlighted
that the "determination of SEBCs is not done solely based on caste, and
hence, the identification of SEBCs is not violative of Article 15(1) of the
Constitution., 135 Yet, the Court also recalled and re-affirmed its Sawheny
holding that "caste could be the starting point for determining the socially
and educationally backward classes of citizens"'' 36 and that "[c]aste is often
used interchangeably with 'class' and can be called as the basic unit in
social stratification." 137  Essentially, this judgment endorsed the
methodology used by the Mandal Commission, the National Commission
for the Backward Classes, and the State Commission for Backward Classes
to identify-SEBCs deserving of quotas. Pro-reservationists rejoiced at the
Court's latest endorsement of the quota system. Yet, anti-reservationists
took solace by emphasizing that the Court also held that the "creamy layer"
sections of the OBCs must not benefit from quotas.
IV: The Importance of Caste in 21st Century India
A. Caste-related Issues Continue to Dominate the Limelight
In Sawhney, the Court eloquently called for the elimination of caste
from society but also noted, "[o]ne cannot fight his enemy [i.e. the caste
system] without recognizing him."'138 In Thakur, the Court declared its
support for the extension of the quota regime to the educational system that
is managed by the central government by declaring:
133. See id. at 47 (stating that the "determination of SEBCs is done not solely based on
caste" and thus does not violate Article 15(1)).
134. See id. (holding that the identification of the SEBCs does not violate Article 15(1)
of the Constitution).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 37.
137. Id. at44.
138. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. 447, 554.
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Reservation is one of the many tools that are used to preserve and
promote the essence of equality .... In the context of education, any
measure that promotes the sharing of knowledge, information and ideas,
and encourages and improves learning, among India's vastly diverse
classes deserves encouragement. To cope with the modem world and its
complexities and turbulent problems, education is a must and it cannot
remain cloistered for the benefit of a privileged few. Reservations
provide that extra advantage to those persons who, without such
support, can forever onlgy dream of university education, without ever
being able to realize it.
Thus, the Court has justified using caste as one of the main
determinants of measuring the "educationally and socially backward
classes" who supposedly comprised the lower echelons of Indian society.
As discussed above, the Mandal Commission methodology in identifying
backward classes is deeply flawed. 4°  Furthermore, this Note has
highlighted the fears of prominent leaders such as Naik that OBC
reservations would perpetuate caste in Indian society.1 41 Even assuming
that the Court charted the correct path in Sawhney, it must be noted that the
Mandal Commission itself called for a review of its scheme after twenty
years. 42 Yet, the Court shied away from addressing the relevance of this
topic in its Thakur judgment. Rather, Justice Raveendran merely noted that
"preferably there should be a review after ten years to take note of the
change of circumstances." 
143
Modem India's founding fathers, such as Prime Minister Nehru and
B.R. Ambedkar, intended for reservations to be merely a temporary tool
through which historically oppressed communities could uplift
themselves. 144 Indeed, Justice Raveendran stated in the Thakur case, "if the
139. Thakur, (2008) 6 S.C.C. at 2.
140. See SHOURIE, supra note 1, at 86-96 (providing the methodology for identifying
the castes, including a description of the survey ordered by the Commission).
141. See id. at 103 (providing Naik's observation that "a tendency is fast developing
among 'Intermediate Backward Classes' to repeat the treatments or rather ill-treatments,
they themselves have received from times immemorial at the hands of the upper castes,
against their brethren").
142. See Sawhney, 1992 A.I.R. 80 S.C. at 594 (stating that the "'entire scheme' should
be reviewed after twenty years").
143. Thakur, (2008) 6 S.C.C. at 177.
144. Empower through education, not reservation: Nehru, THE ECONOMIC TIMEs, Apr.
11, 2008 (citing 5 JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, LETTERS TO CHIEF MINIsTERs 1947-1964 456-57
(1989)), available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/Empower
througheducationnotreservationNehru/articleshow/2943009.cms (urging states to provide
backward classes of citizens with good educational and technical training facilities and
expressed his opposition to reservations on the basis of caste or religion) (on file with
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reservation is continued in spite of achieving the object of reservation, the
law which was valid when made, may become invalid."'145 One indicator
that caste-based disparities are declining as a result of the reservation
system would be the removal of castes from OBC lists in states where
reservations have been utilized for many decades. Unfortunately, the reality
is that reservations have become a commonly used strategy by which
political parties can win over caste-based voting blocs. Thus, no castes have
been removed or are likely to be removed from "backward" lists regardless
of their social, educational, and political advancement.
Predictably, caste-based divisions are on the rise and caste itself
remains highly relevant in contemporary Indian society.146 Communities
clamor for recognition as OBCs and often the determination of their status
is made based on their "vote-bank" strength. 147  Although it may be
premature to accurately measure the impact of reservations for OBCs in
central government employment, there are strong indications that politically
powerful castes have cornered the benefits of reservations at the expense of
genuinely indigent non-SC castes. 148 These non-SC communities, although
included in the OBC list, lack the political means to seize the benefits
offered.
The experience of state governments with reservations for OBCs
provides valuable insight into the potential future and likely efficacy of the
implementation of the Mandal Commission's recommendation at the
central level. For instance, reservations in Tamil Nadu have a history
dating back to 1919,149 and today, almost a hundred years later, there is no
discussion of dismantling the compensatory discrimination system. Instead,
the State of Tamil Nadu continues to have a 69% reservation policy, in
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
145. Thakur, (2008) 6 S.C.C. at 177.
146. See Christophe Jaffrelot, India: Caste Stronger than Religion?, 32 INT'L INST. FOR
ASIAN STUDIES NEWSLErrER 1, 18 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.iias.nl/nl/32/
iias..n132_18.pdf (explaining that caste-based formulations are highly important and relevant
to electoral success in Indian politics).
147. See Simon Robinson, The Race to the Bottom of the Ladder, TIME, June 5, 2007,
available at http://www.time.contime/world/article/0,8599,1628192,00.html?xid=rss-
world&iid=sphere-inline-bottom (stating that "political parties have pledged to bring more
and more groups under the affirmative action umbrella").
148. See Ashok Kumar Pankaj Rothak, Mandal H: A Dilemma of Democracy,
HARDNEWS MEDIA, April/May 2006, available at http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/
2006/05/438 (stating that "[tlhe problem is that those who are better off corner the benefits
of reservation policy").
149. See, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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defiance of the 50% quota limit set by the Supreme Court in Balaji.150
Although Parliament enacted a law that placed Tamil Nadu's blatant
defiance of the 50% quota limit beyond the purview of the Supreme Court,
the latter recently held that such laws are subject to judicial review if they
violate fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.1
5 '
The southern states, led by Tamil Nadu, are considered to be role-
models for social progress. If these states have achieved substantial social
progress, a discussion needs to commence on the need to dismantle
reservations within a stipulated time frame for those castes that have
overcome their "backwardness." For instance, a 2005 study detailing
medical college admissions in Tamil Nadu reveals that the students from
the "reserved" categories actually garnered a larger share of seats than
upper-caste candidates in the "open" category-i.e. seats open for students
regardless of their caste background. 152 This is evidence that certain castes
that continue to be labeled as "backward" no longer require special
assistance to compete against so-called upper-castes.
A few examples will demonstrate how reservations, intended to uplift
a few disadvantaged communities, have become simply a political tool. In
2000, the then-Chairman of the Backward Classes Commission of Andhra
Pradesh noted that most castes except Kammas, Jains, and Anglo-Indians
tried to claim "backward" status. 153  In Karnataka, the Lingayats and
Vokkaliga, two powerful castes who constitute a significant portion of the
state's population, used their political clout to gain admission into the OBC
lists formulated by the state in 1986, despite their initial exclusion.
54
Scholars such as M.N. Srinivas have explained their opposition to the quota
system for OBCs due to such abuses of the system. 
155
In Sawhney, the Supreme Court rejected reservations for the poor
among the upper-caste communities, but that did not prevent the Rajasthan
150. Sheela Bhatt, SC Judgment Exposes the Legislature, REDIFF NEWS, Jan. 11, 2007,
available at http://us.rediff.com/news/2007/janI 1 spec.htm.
151. See id. (stating that "although the government is entitled to place laws in the Ninth
Schedule, if it violates the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 19, 20 and
21 of the Constitution they are liable to be struck down by the courts").
152. K. Ramachandran, Reserved Classes Forge Ahead, THE HINDU, July 20, 2005,
available at http://www.hindu.com2005/07/20/stories/2005072011970100.htm.
153. P.K. Misra, Backward Castes Census: An Outmoded Idea, ECON. AND POL.
WKLY., June 16, 2007, at 2247.
154. M.N. Srinivas, Employment Quotas in India, 8 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 19, 20
(1992).
155. Id. (criticizing the quota system as "tokenist" and not a real solution to mass
poverty).
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government from passing a resolution in 2003 proposing a 14% reservation
for impoverished sections of the upper-castes. 56 Recently, Mayawati, the
most prominent Dalit politician, promised reservations for the poor among
the upper-castes in order to consolidate her Dalit-Brahmin alliance in the
state of Uttar Pradesh.1
57
In Rajasthan, out of a total of 316 identified castes, only 11 are not
entitled to some form of reservation. 158 In 2007, members of the Gujjar
caste violently demonstrated for ST status in Rajasthan, even though they
are entitled to reservations as OBCs in that state. 59 The Meenas, a sizable
ST community in Rajasthan, responded to the Gujjar agitation by
threatening to carry out counter-protests.16° The Gujjars demanded ST
status in Rajasthan because they were classified as such in two other Indian
states-although they are classified as OBCs in all other Indian states in
which they reside-and because an ST classification would enable them to
161corner a larger share of the reserved seats in employment and education.
Anand Teltumbde, a Dalit intellectual, posits that the Gujjars did not agitate
for SC status because a conferment as Dalit would carry a "social
stigma... which no non-SC caste would like to incur no matter what the
benefit.
'"162
B. Reservations Must be Focused Exclusively for
the Benefit of SC/ST Communities
The "pie" of government jobs and seats in government-managed
educational institutions is shrinking in an India increasingly dominated by
the private sector. Nevertheless, politicians successfully convince the
general populace that progress is being achieved by merely granting
quotas. 63 The late M.N. Srinivas, India's most renowned sociologist and
156. See Editorial, Shrinking Pie, ECON. AND POL. WKLY., July 5, 2003, at 2784.
157. See Teltumbde, supra note 24, at 2383 (describing political reservations for
impoverished sections of the upper-castes).
158. See Shrinking Pie, supra note 156, at 2784.
159. See Teltumbde, supra note 24, at 2383 (describing a protest demanding ST status
in order to obtain reservations).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also Robinson, supra note 147 (describing Gujjar protests regarding
government classification).
163. See Teltumbde, supra note 24, at 2384 ("[R]eservations came handy for diverting
the attention of people from the deepening unemployment... during the 1980s and ... after
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best-known authority on the caste system, explained his opposition to the
current system:
[T]he gravamen of my charge against reservation is that it has come in
the way of adopting a policy of sustained attack on mass poverty.
Caste-based reservation of jobs and seats has provided an easy way out,
since it satisfies the aspiration of elites in each sub-group. It is
"tokenist" and not a real solution to backwardness, economic, social or
educational ... caste-based reservation has heightened caste-
consciousness everywhere and promoted inter-caste conflict, and in
some areas, what journalists call "caste-wars". I am against caste-
based reservations for jobs--except for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes for a temporary period, because of the institution of
untouchability in the case of SCs, and isolation from the mainstream in
the case of STs.
164
Ideally, M.N. Srinivas' suggestion, providing reservations only for
SC/ST communities, should be implemented by the Indian government at
both the federal and state level. The reservations system that is currently in
place for OBCs should be dismantled within a stipulated time frame which
would then open up over 75% of available vacancies on the basis of merit.
Anand Teltumbde echoes Srinivas' critique by calling for a return to
the "original vision of reservations," wherein the focus is on SC/ST
communities. 65 He maintains that the reservation system is digressing to a
point where eventually all vacancies in government jobs and educational
institutions would be reserved proportionally for various castes based on
their numerical strength in the total population. 166 This would result in a
system that would be "meaningless."' 67 Teltumbde also urges the private
sector, the judiciary, and the army to consider reservations for SC/ST
communities. 68 Furthermore, he also calls for a time-bound phasing out of
reservations because the beneficiaries-i.e. SC/ST communities-would




164. M.N. Srinivas, supra note 154, at 19-20.
165. Teltumbde, supra note 24, at 2385.
166. Id. (criticizing the current growth in claims against the reservation system).
167. Id. (arguing that allowing everyone to be apportioned equal parts of the system
according to population violates social justice principles by ignoring the differential resource
bases of castes).
168. Id. (claiming that a solution lies in reverting to the original conception of
reservations for only the most disabled classes, the SCs and STs).
169. Id. (viewing caste-based distinctions as a disease that must be cured quickly).
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This Note focuses on the relationship between quotas and OBCs.
However, it would be incomplete without a discussion of whether
reservations have been successful in uplifting the SC/ST communities.
Empirical evidence indicates that SC/ST communities have benefited
substantially from reservations in the past few decades. One study posits
that approximately one third of all SC/ST students attending colleges in the
1990s were beneficiaries of compensatory discrimination. 70 Staunch anti-
reservationists, such as Arun Shourie, have criticized the quota system even
for these communities, while some academics, like M.N. Srinivas, note that
certain SC sub-castes, such as the Mahars of Maharahstra, have cornered
most of the benefits at the expense of other sub-castes, such as Chambar,
Mang, and Dor.1
7 1
Despite such shortcomings, the scale of the historical oppression of
Dalits, combined with their present plight throughout India, 172 makes it
imperative that reservations continue for them. Dalit Christians and Dalit
Muslims should also be able to take advantage of quota provisions, as they
too are heavily discriminated against by their co-religionists. 173 The issue
of whether these Dalit Christians and Dalit Muslims are entitled to
reservations, and, if so, whether the 15% quota for SCs must be expanded,
is under litigation in the Supreme Court.
174
Teltumbde's suggestion that compensatory discrimination be
implemented in the private sector is also worthy of serious consideration.
A survey conducted by two academics from the City University of New
170. Thomas E. Weisskopf, Impact of Reservations on Admissions to Higher Education
in India, EcON. AND POL. WKLY., Sep. 25, 2004, at 4339.
171. Srinivas, supra note 154, at 19 ("[The Mahars of Maharashtra... tend to
predominate in jobs reserved for the SCs and at the expense of other castes such as Mang,
Dhor and Chambhar.").
172. See Police Escort Dalit Students to School, THE HINDU, Feb. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2008/02/22/stories/2008022254280400.htm (describing how police
were necessary to escort Dalit students to their school); see also Vidya Subrahmaniam, A
System Against the Dalits, THE HINDU, Mar. 14, 2007, available at
http:/lwww.thehindu.com/2007/03/14/stories/2007031402091100.htm (describing continu-
ing violence against the Dalits).
173. See K. Srilata, A Palmyra Leaf That Sears Us, THE HINDu, Sep. 16, 2001,
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/200l/09/16/stories/1316017m.htm (describing the
oppressive state that the Dalits live in); see also Archbishop Promises Equal Access to
Dalits, THE HINDu, Mar. 19, 2008, available at http://www.hindu.coml2008/03/19/stofies/
2008031952460600.htm (describing a Catholic exception to caste distinction in limited
circumstances).
174. J. Venkatesan, Center Gets Time to Decide on Quota for Dalit Christians, THE
HINDu, Jan. 24, 2008, available at http://www.hindu.com/2008/01/24/storiesl
2008012460161300.htm.
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York reveals that Dalits face significant discrimination when applying for
jobs in the Indian private sector.' In February 2008, the Mayawati
government in Uttar Pradesh announced reservations in projects that
involved a public-private partnership, although details of the scheme remain
unclear. 176 While quotas in the private sector may not necessarily be the
way forward, some companies have begun to take positive steps to
encourage the employment of Oalits.177 Other organizations would do well
to emulate the examples set by these companies.
A decision to dismantle the OBC quota system is unlikely to occur in
the foreseeable future. Yet, if it ever does happen, those who favor the
current system would allege that such a step would ensure upper-caste
domination of government jobs and educational seats. They assert that the
upper-caste youth enjoy unfair advantages over the OBCs because they tend
to be more fluent in English-the medium of instruction at most public
universities-and are able to afford superior schooling and tuition facilities.
However, this Note has already demonstrated that many of the sub-castes in
the OBC list are not truly "backward." Additionally, vociferous supporters
of the Mandal Commission state that reservations will end "when equality
is achieved,"'178 although statistics reveal that the average OBC is no poorer
than the average Indian. With regard to social status, many OBC
communities do not perceive themselves as "ritualistically backward," but
merely claim backwardness for administrative benefits.
Furthermore, the Mandal Commission also suggested numerous steps,
besides quotas, as means through which the OBCs could be uplifted. Some
of these steps included intensive tutorials for students applying for entry to
technical and vocation-education facilities; implementing land reforms so
that those castes trapped in a feudalistic society could break out of their
175. S. Anand, Not Quite Like Us, TEHELKA NEws, Nov. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.tehelka.com/story-main36.asp?filename=cr241107not-quite.asp.
176. Mayawati Announces Reservations in Private Sector, THE INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan.
18, 2008, available at http://www.expressindia.con/latest-news/Mayawati-announces-
reservations-in-private-sector/262923.
177. See With Reservations, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?storyid=E1_JJDJPTJ (describing
how leading Indian companies, such as Infosys, provide special training to Dalit employees).
But see Venkitesh Ramkrishnan, Examining Reservation, FRONTLINE, May 5, 2006,
available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2308/stories/20060505004600400.htm
(explaining that business leaders, while accepting the need for more socially inclusive
policies, oppose compensatory discrimination modeled on government lines as it will
adversely affect global competitiveness).
178. With Reservations, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?storyid=ElJJDJPTJ.
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cycle of rural poverty; and taking steps to make credit and other financial
facilities available to OBC entrepreneurs. 79 The government may already
be taking such steps; if so, it needs to ensure that the delivery system is
functioning effectively. The government can also provide vouchers for
genuinely needy lower castes (and SCs/STs) to attend private schools, so
that they are able to compete effectively against the "privileged" castes
when they apply for colleges and jobs. 80 Because government-managed
schools are abysmal in most Indian states, such a step is likely to be
welcomed by many beneficiaries.
C. A New Process is Needed to Identify the Truly Needy
Among the "Backward Classes"
The current system is too well entrenched. Dramatic changes, such as
dismantling the entire quota system for OBCs, are highly unlikely to
materialize. India has emerged as a relatively stable and cohesive nation,
especially in relation to other post-colonial societies, largely due to its well-
functioning democratic system. Diverse groups distinguished by caste,
ethnicity, religion, and linguistic affiliation have exercised influence in the
system through peaceful democratic methods for the most part. If
reservations are dismantled for OBCs too rapidly, there is a danger of
anarchy. Thus, other compromise solutions must also be considered.
The Mandal Commission suggested a 52% reservation for OBC
communities even though this is a proportional quota-i.e. the number of
seats reserved is based on the representation in the population. 181 Such an
approach is unnecessary because Articles 15(4) and 16(4) suggest that
reservations be provided for communities whose representation in
government services is only "inadequate."'182 The Supreme Court held that
reservations should not exceed 50%. Thus, the quota for OBCs was capped
179. See Venkitesh Ramkrishnan, Examining Reservation, FRONTLINE MAGAZINE, May
5, 2006, available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2308/stories/20060505004600
400.htm (discussing the implementation of another portion of the Mandal Commission
report by reserving seats in educational institutions for Other Backward Classes).
180. See Arvind Subramanium, Caste Aside, WALL STREET JOURNAL ASIA, June 8, 2007
(discussing voucher schemes in India that are used to provide educational opportunities for
historically disadvantaged segments of the population).
181. Prior, supra note 13, at 96.
182. See id. (stating that the Indian Constitution does not support proportional
representation of classes for jobs and university seats).
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at 27%. If a consensus, which will not be easy to reach, 183 can be arrived at
that OBCs constitute only 36% of the population, and not 52%, then
reservations for OBCs can be reduced to 15%. Concurrently, communities
whose inclusion was on shaky grounds in the first place could be excluded
on a time-based schedule, allowing the truly needy OBCs to take full
advantage of available benefits.
Yogendra Yadav, a leading sociologist who in principle favors
reservations for the OBCs on the basis of caste, has designed a more
comprehensive list of criteria than the Mandal Commission to identify the
genuinely needy among the OBCs. 184 Recognizing that the Mandal system
tends to benefit the affluent among the OBCs, Yadav's criteria are more
comprehensive and contain factors such as region, caste, gender, type of
school attended, and family background.185 Jawaharlal Nehru University, a
premier institution located in New Delhi, uses a similar system to identify
candidates for admission. 186
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court, in its eagerness to promote equality for all in
terms of access to public sector employment and education, has instead
helped perpetuate caste-consciousness in India by endorsing the
methodically flawed and politically tainted process of identifying "socially
and educationally backward classes" deserving of compensatory
discrimination. Indeed, some members of the Court, such as Justice
Raveendran seem to have recognized this irony by noting in the Thakur
judgment:
To start with, the effect of reservation may appear to perpetuate caste.
The immediate effect of caste-based reservation has been rather
unfortunate. In the pre-reservation era, people wanted to get rid of the
backward tag-either social or economical. But post reservation, there
183. See P.K. Mishra, Backward Castes Census: An Outmoded Idea, ECON. AND POL.
WKLY., June 16, 2007, at 2245 (opposing a new census based on a caste criteria on a variety
of reasons including that the Indian state is trying to reduce caste consciousness and will
encounter too many difficulties in accurately measuring caste).
184. Yogendra Yadav & Satish Deshpande, Redesigning Affirmative Action, ECON. AND
POL. WKLY., June 17, 2006, at 2424 (discussing alternative model to caste quotas, which is
evidence based, focusing on sources of disadvantage).
185. Id.
186. Id. (mentioning Jawaharlal Nehru University as an example of an institution that
uses region to categorize backwardness).
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is a tendency even among those who are considered as "forward," to
seek "backward" tag, in the hope of enjoying the benefits of
"backwardness." When more and more people aspire for
"backwardness" instead of "forwardness" the country itself
stagnates... Any provision for reservation is a temporary crutch. Such
crutch, byTunnecessary prolonged use, should not become a permanent
liability. u
Unfortunately, such warnings are rarely heeded by legislatures.
Furthermore, the Court itself is unwilling to firmly direct the government to
ensure that reservations are phased out in a timely manner.
The Indian state deserves credit for embarking on a daunting project to
reduce caste-based inequalities. This Note recognizes that caste-based
inequalities will not disappear overnight and that the government must take
special steps to alleviate the situation of the SCs, STs, and the genuinely
needy among the "backward classes." However, quotas are not the only
way in which caste-based inequalities can be reduced. Although a system
of reservations has played an important role in uplifting the Dalits, it has
been ineffective in helping the genuinely needy among the OBCs.
Furthermore, the reservation system for OBCs has played a role in the
continued suppression of the Dalits. Thus, new measures must be
contemplated to assist the truly needy sections of the OBC community.
Finally, as India's economy liberalizes further, policy-makers need to find
pragmatic solutions that will ensure that the Dalits and other historically
oppressed castes act as participants in India's changing economic
landscape.
187. Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 S.C.C. 1, 182.

